Federal Interventions in Private Enterprise in the United States: Their Genesis in and Effects on Corporate Finance Instruments and Transactions by Heminway, Joan MacLeod
HEMINWAY_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2010 4:02 PM 
 
1487 
Federal Interventions in Private Enterprise 
 in the United States: Their Genesis in and Effects  
on Corporate Finance Instruments and Transactions 
Joan MacLeod Heminway∗ 
“[D]ealmakers would do well to take a step back during this 
downturn and rethink their own strategy based on the lessons of 
the government’s actions and recent events.  Forms should be 
rethought and redrafted, and dealmakers should rethink 
fundamental deal structures and financing arrangements . . . .”
1
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few years, in response to an international financial 
meltdown, state governments intervened in economies all over the 
world.  As a result, government and business are interconnected in 
more numerous ways than perhaps ever before.  Governments have 
increased their regulatory control over businesses in financial services 
and other sectors; businesses assist governments in implementing 
regulation; and governments are directly and indirectly engaged in 
financing businesses that had been conducted through non-
governmental entities. 
The United States exemplifies this new public-private archetype. 
[E]ven as the . . . paradigm semi-nationalized some traditional 
private financial services in the United States, it also contributed 
to the privatization of government functions, which, during this 
period, were in many ways “run like a business” rather than as a 
 
 ∗ College of Law Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee 
College of Law; J.D., New York University School of Law; A.B., Brown University.  I 
am indebted to Steve Davidoff and David Zaring, whose article, cited infra note 2, 
along with the follow-on book written by Steve, cited infra note 1, provided the 
impetus for this Article.  In addition, each took time to read an earlier draft of this 
Article.  I also owe thanks to George Kuney and Paul Harner, whose academic and 
practice backgrounds inform the included discussion of the Chrysler LLC and 
General Motors Company bankruptcy reorganizations. 
 1 STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF, GODS AT WAR 298 (2009). 
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regulator. The government was doing deals and taking stakes in 
profit-making institutions.
2
 
This Article focuses on the U.S. government’s engagement in and 
with corporate finance
3
 as an example of this public-private 
engagement. 
In response to U.S. corporate failures involved in the current 
global financial crisis, traditional corporate finance vehicles and tools 
were widely used in new ways and for new purposes.
4
  Of course, one 
object of the U.S. government’s investment and intervention in, and 
exercise of influence over, private enterprise during the crisis was to 
provide for or ensure the provision of adequate capital funding.  But 
its investment, intervention, and influence also represented a new 
way to oversee and otherwise regulate key business enterprises in the 
financial services and automotive sectors.  A pair of scholar-authors 
termed the phenomenon “regulation by deal.”
5
 
The flexibility of corporate finance instruments and transactions 
has been a hallmark of U.S. corporate law and practice, and in that 
sense, recent events are consistent with other chapters in the history 
of corporate finance in the United States.  Nonetheless, it is 
important for us to look at recent public interventions in private 
enterprise not merely as a continuation of the past but also as 
different (and in some cases, new) breeds of corporate finance 
transaction—especially since the government is an explicit or implicit 
party.  Moreover, strict scrutiny of these transactions may remind us 
of forgotten benefits to, and expose flaws in, existing transaction 
documents or structures. 
The financial crisis-related transactions that illustrate these 
points are too numerous to cover here in full.  A sampling of 
transactions, however, can begin to shed light on some of the 
corporate finance issues that arise from the U.S. government’s recent 
investments, interventions, and influence in and over corporate 
finance.  Accordingly, this Article reviews certain aspects of the use of 
preferred stock, bankruptcy-related proceedings, and mergers and 
acquisitions in connection with the government’s recent, crisis-mode 
 
 2 Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response 
to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 468–69 (2009). 
 3 The term “corporate finance” is used broadly and includes all instruments and 
transactions embodying or providing for the inflow, transformation, or utilization of 
capital in a business entity (e.g., corporation, LLC, etc.). 
 4 DAVIDOFF, supra note 1, at 246 (“The government dealmakers and their lawyers 
used the enormous power of government to structure some truly novel deals that 
stretched the law to the breaking point at times.”). 
 5 See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 2, at 463. 
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interventions in private enterprise.  Further, it analyzes corporate 
finance aspects of these exploits and highlights potential effects of 
these activities on corporate finance instruments, transactions, and 
legal practice. 
II. REGULATION THROUGH PREFERRED STOCK PURCHASES 
Beginning with its commitment to acquire a 79.9% voting and 
dividend interest in American International Group, Inc. (AIG) in 
September 2008,
6
 the United States, acting through the Department 
of the Treasury, invested in newly designated and issued series of 
preferred stock in various financial services firms as part of its bailout 
plan.  For example, as part of the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP), the U.S. Treasury invested in, among other iconic American 
banking corporations, Bank of America Corporation (BoA) and 
Citigroup Inc. (Citigroup), in addition to AIG.
7
  The U.S. 
government purchased twenty billion dollars worth of preferred stock 
in BoA and Citigroup alone.
8
 
The U.S. government’s TARP investments replaced an earlier 
plan to bail out failing banks exclusively through the purchase of 
“mortgage-related assets.”
9
  Predictably, taxpayers and investors 
reacted adversely to this plan, which they perceived as both creating 
enhanced moral hazard and leaving the U.S. government (and, 
therefore, taxpayers) unprotected.
10
  The U.S. government’s 
preferred stock investments in financial services firms gave it a 
current, long-term financial and, to some extent, governance stake in 
the recovery of these systemically important firms.  As a result, these 
investments curbed moral hazard and better protected U.S. 
government interests.  Moreover, the preferred stock investments 
ranked ahead of the publicly traded common stock of these entities 
 
 6 DAVIDOFF, supra note 1, at 257; Darla Mercado, AIG Announces Preferred Stock 
Issue, INVESTMENT NEWS, (Sept. 26, 2008, 6:13 PM), 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20080926/REG/809269948.  A trust 
created for the benefit of the U.S Treasury made the AIG investment.  See William K. 
Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 964–65 (2009). 
 7 OFFICE OF FIN. STABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT: THE TROUBLED 
ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM (TARP) 7 (2009), available at 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/09%20OFS_CitizensReport%20MAR2.pdf.  
 8 Id. 
 9 See Edward V. Murphy & Baird Webel, Proposal to Allow Treasury to Buy Mortgage-
Related Assets to Address Financial Instability, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., Sept. 22, 2008, at 2, 
available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/110286.pdf; see also 
DAVIDOFF, supra note 1, at 265. 
 10 See Deborah Solomon et al., U.S. to Buy Stakes in Nation’s Largest Banks, WALL ST. 
J., Oct. 14, 2008, at A1. 
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on the priority ladder, could be issued without shareholder approval, 
and could be constructed to have debt-like features.  In sum, 
preferred stock was the most suitable available financial instrument 
for these investments and proved to be a flexible tool in the federal 
bailout. 
This Part of the Article describes both the corporate authority to 
designate and issue the preferred stock that enabled the U.S. 
government to make these equity investments and significant terms 
and provisions of the preferred stock issued, using AIG, BoA, and 
Citigroup as key examples.  The description of these facets of the 
government’s preferred stock investments provides relevant legal 
details important to corporate finance practitioners and other key 
participants in capital-raising transactions.  In addition, it illuminates 
the legal aspects of corporate finance that make preferred stock an 
advantageous investment vehicle in the bailout and in other capital 
investment situations. 
A Blank Check Authority to Designate a Series of Preferred Stock 
AIG, BoA, and Citigroup are Delaware corporations.
11
  The 
certificate of incorporation (or charter) for each corporation, as in 
effect on the date of the applicable preferred stock investment by the 
U.S. government, authorized the issuance of preferred stock (as well 
as common stock) and authorized its board of directors to designate 
different series of preferred stock and to determine the terms and 
provisions of those designated series.
12
  This type of authority, 
 
 11 See American International Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K/A) (Mar. 
31, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/ 
000095012310030851/y83597e10vkza.htm; Bank of America Corporation, Annual 
Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 26, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/70858/000119312510041666/d10k.htm; 
Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 26, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/000120677410000406/citi_10k.ht
m. 
 12 See American International Group, Inc., Certificate of Incorporation Annual 
Report (Form 10-K), at Ex. 3(i) (Mar. 28, 1997), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/0000950123-97-002720.txt 
[hereinafter AIG CoI]; Bank of America Corporation, Amended and Restated 
Certificate of Incorporation (Form 10-Q), at Ex. 3(a) (Nov. 6, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/70858/000119312508228086/dex3a.htm 
[hereinafter BoA CoI]; Citigroup Inc., Certificate of Incorporation Quarterly Report 
(Form 10-Q), at Ex. 3.01 (Nov. 12, 1998), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/0001047469-98-040485.txt 
[hereinafter Citigroup CoI]; see also Sjostrom, supra note 6, at 977 (“AIG was and is 
able to issue the . . . preferred stock without stockholder approval in accordance with 
Delaware law because its authorized capital stock includes six million shares of ‘Serial 
Preferred Stock” for which the board of directors is empowered, as contemplated by 
HEMINWAY_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2010  4:02 PM 
2010] FEDERAL INTERVENTIONS 1491 
permitted under section 151 of the General Corporation Law of the 
State of Delaware,
13
 is known as “blank check authority,” and the 
preferred stock authorized under that authority often is referred to as 
“blank check” preferred stock.
14
 
Blank check authority to issue preferred stock allows a 
corporation to be more nimble in obtaining equity financing.
15
  
Absent blank check authority, a corporation must amend its 
certificate of incorporation in order to establish new classes or series 
of preferred stock,
16
 and that amendment requires both board and 
stockholder votes under Delaware law.
17
  Given the requirements that 
must be met under state and federal law in connection with a public 
company stockholder vote (e.g., advance notice of the meeting and 
the creation and filing of proxy materials), an amendment to a 
certificate of incorporation may take several months to accomplish.
18
  
 
section 151(a) of Delaware General Corporation Law, to fix the rights, preferences, 
and limitations.”). 
 13 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (2010). 
 14 See Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of Shareholder 
Choice, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 577, 609 (2003) (“Blank check preferred stock contains 
open terms that can be specified by the board at the time it is issued.”); J. Robert 
Brown, Jr., Speaking with Complete Candor: Shareholder Ratification and the Elimination of 
the Duty of Loyalty, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 641, 644 n.12 (2003) (“Blank-check preferred 
stock provisions allowed management to issue new classes of shares without 
shareholder approval.”); John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: 
Blame the Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1357 (2001) (referencing “blank check” 
authority to issue preferred stock); John H. Matheson & Jon R. Norberg, Hostile Share 
Acquisitions and Corporate Governance: A Framework for Evaluating Antitakeover Activities, 
47 U. PITT. L. REV. 407, 460 n.198 (1986) (“‘Blank check’ preferred is stock 
authorized by the shareholders, the rights and preferences of which may be 
determined by the board of directors at a later date.”). 
 15 See Matheson & Norberg, supra note 14, at 460 n.198 (“The ostensible purpose 
for a board to secure authorization for ‘blank check’ preferred stock traditionally was 
to give the board flexibility in securing financing for the corporation.”).  It also 
allows corporations other flexibility in using preferred stock—e.g., in fending off 
takeovers.  See, e.g., Coates, supra note 14, at 1357 (noting the use of blank check 
preferred stock as part of a poison pill device). 
 16 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (2010). 
 17 Id. § 242(b).  
 18 The Delaware corporate law statute on the timing of notices for stockholder 
meetings reads as follows: 
Unless otherwise provided in this chapter, the written notice of any 
meeting shall be given not less than 10 nor more than 60 days before 
the date of the meeting to each stockholder entitled to vote at such 
meeting as of the record date for determining the stockholders 
entitled to notice of the meeting. 
Id. § 222(b).  The federal proxy rule on the filing of proxy materials provides that 
[f]ive preliminary copies of the proxy statement and form of proxy 
shall be filed with the Commission at least 10 calendar days prior to the 
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Accordingly, blank check authority was critical to the government’s 
ability to quickly purchase stock in AIG, BoA, Citigroup, and other 
troubled corporations as part of its bailout strategy.
19
 
The drafting of the blank check provision is different in each of 
the applicable certificates of incorporation.  BoA’s certificate of 
incorporation, in effect at the time the U.S. government invested, 
included a short, and seemingly limited, blank check authorization: 
The Board of Directors of the Corporation shall have full power 
and authority to establish one or more series within the class of 
preferred shares (the “Preferred Shares”), to define the 
designations, preferences, limitations and relative rights 
(including conversion rights) of shares within such class and to 
determine all variations between series.
20
 
The BoA blank check provision does not track the language in 
section 151(a) of the General Corporation Law of the State of 
Delaware that permits the grant of blank check authority.
21
  The 
statutory text allows for the board to establish, by resolution, a class or 
series of preferred stock having specified “voting powers, full or 
limited, or no voting powers, and . . . designations, preferences and 
relative, participating, optional or other special rights, and 
qualifications, limitations or restrictions thereof.”
22
  The Delaware 
statute provides that the board’s power to designate series of 
preferred stock arises from “authority expressly vested in it by the 
provisions of its certificate of incorporation.”
23
 
Notably, the BoA blank check provision fails to mention the 
authority to establish voting powers.  The reference to “relative 
rights”
24
 in the BoA provision may not cover voting powers because 
both terms are separately used in the statute and the statute does not 
indicate that voting powers are relative rights or that relative rights 
include voting powers.  Moreover, the term “all variations between 
 
date definitive copies of such material are first sent or given to security 
holders, or such shorter period prior to that date as the Commission 
may authorize upon a showing of good cause thereunder. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(a) (2010).  The proxy materials typically are distributed with 
the notice of meeting. 
 19 See DAVIDOFF, supra note 1 at 257–58. 
 20 BoA CoI, supra note 12. 
 21 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (2010). 
 22 Id.  The same provision summarizes this list defining the scope of the board’s 
permissive authority as the power to determine the “voting powers, designations, 
preferences, rights and qualifications, limitations or restrictions” of a class or series of 
preferred stock.  Id. 
 23 Id. (emphasis added). 
 24 BoA CoI, supra note 12. 
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series”
25
 in BoA’s certificate of incorporation does not seem sufficient 
to expressly provide for board authority to designate a series of 
preferred stock including voting powers.  The language in the blank 
check provision of BoA’s certificate of incorporation, which fails to 
clearly, expressly authorize the board of directors to determine the 
voting powers of a series of preferred stock, is important; in Waggoner 
v. Laster,26 the Delaware Supreme Court found that generalized text 
in a blank check charter provision was insufficient to grant the board 
of directors authority to establish voting powers in designating a 
series of preferred stock under Delaware law.
27
  Despite the omission 
from the BoA certificate of incorporation of clear, express director 
authority to determine the voting powers of a series of preferred 
stock, the terms of the BoA preferred stock purchased by the U.S. 
government included voting rights.
28
 
The blank check authority provisions for AIG and Citigroup are 
different and more detailed than that of BoA.  Each certificate of 
incorporation includes a general grant of authority to the board of 
directors to designate and determine the terms and provisions of 
series of preferred stock.  This general statement of authority is 
accompanied in each case by a nonexclusive list of authorized terms 
and provisions that more precisely defines the scope of the board’s 
authority.
29
  For example, each blank check provision authorizes the 
board to determine for each series: the distinctive designation 
number of shares, voting rights, dividend rights, redemption rights, 
conversion rights, and rights on liquidation or dissolution.
30
  The 
language in the two certificates of incorporation defining these 
 
 25 Id. 
 26 581 A.2d 1127 (Del. 1990). 
 27 The court concluded as follows: 
The power to establish voting rights was conspicuously absent from the 
enumerated rights and powers granted the board.  While that omission 
may have been accidental, given the requirements of Delaware law this 
Court cannot presume so and thereafter supply the missing provisions.  
Under the rule of strict construction, any ambiguity must be resolved 
against granting preferences, rights or powers. 
Id. at 1135.  Admittedly, the provision at issue in the Waggoner case also included 
language limiting voting rights to the common stockholders unless otherwise 
provided in the statute or in a resolution adopted by the board of directors, which is 
different from the more broad language in the BoA provision.  Id. at 1130.  The 
nature of any resolution approved by the board in Waggoner was unclear.  Id. at 1132. 
 28 See infra notes 54 & 55 and accompanying text.  Earlier designated series of 
preferred stock also purportedly afford stockholders voting rights.  See BoA CoI, supra 
note 12. 
 29 See AIG CoI, supra note 12; Citigroup CoI, supra note 12. 
 30 Id. 
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specific authorizations is, however, different in a number of respects 
not relevant here.
31
  Moreover, in addition to the express authority 
afforded to the board to determine specific provisions, each blank 
check provision includes a catchall authorization allowing the board 
to determine, in AIG’s case, “[a]ny other relative rights, preferences 
or limitations of the shares of the series not inconsistent herewith or 
with applicable law”
32
 or, in the case of Citigroup, “[a]ny other 
relative, participating, optional or other special rights, qualifications, 
limitations or restrictions of that series.”
33
 
The risk of employing a detailed list of powers and rights in 
drafting blank check authority provisions for corporate charters is 
that by setting forth each feature of preferred stock that the board is 
authorized to determine, a corporation may inadvertently leave a 
desired feature of the preferred stock off the list or otherwise 
unintentionally limit the board’s authority to establish the terms of a 
future class or series of preferred stock.  To the extent that the 
omitted feature is not adequately covered by non-exclusivity 
provisions or a catchall provision, any designation by the board of 
directors of a new series of preferred stock with that feature would be 
unauthorized—ultra vires.  The AIG certificate of incorporation and 
the Citigroup certificate of incorporation each include all of the key 
attributes of preferred stock set forth in the statute, although (as 
noted above) the precise wording for each is different from that for 
the other.  While in each of these corporate charters (the AIG and 
Citigroup certificates of incorporation) the specific wording of each 
listed term (or attribute) is broad, individual facts may raise questions 
about the extent of the board’s authority in providing for terms and 
provisions of a particular class or series of preferred stock. 
Accordingly, although drafting in the AIG, BoA, and Citigroup 
certificates of incorporation did not impede the U.S. government’s 
preferred stock investments, none of the blank check authorizations 
sampled here is optimally constructed.  To offer a board the 
maximum flexibility in establishing a series of preferred stock and 
determining its terms and provisions and to forestall litigation over 
detailed lists regarding permitted terms (even if the lists are self-
described as nonexclusive and are inclusive of a broad catchall 
provision), a drafter of blank check charter authority should use the 
precise words in the general blank check authority provision of the 
relevant corporate statute without embellishment.  This type of blank 
 
 31 Id. 
 32 AIG CoI, supra note 12. 
 33 Citigroup CoI, supra note 12. 
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check authority, a form of which is included in many certificates of 
incorporation for Delaware corporations, would read as follows: 
The corporation may issue Preferred Stock from time to time in 
one or more series as the Board of Directors may establish by the 
adoption of a resolution or resolutions relating thereto, each 
series to have such voting powers, full or limited, or no voting 
powers, and such designations, preferences and relative, 
participating, optional or other special rights, and qualifications, 
limitations or restrictions thereof, as shall be stated and expressed 
in the resolution or resolutions providing for the issue of such 
series adopted by the Board of Directors pursuant to authority to 
do so, which authority is hereby granted to the Board of 
Directors.
34
 
Of course, if the legislature amends the statute after the certificate of 
incorporation is filed, this approach may not continue to provide the 
all-inclusive authority intended by the drafter after the statutory 
amendment becomes effective.  But statutory amendments also are 
likely to wreak similar havoc with other drafting approaches. 
B. Stock Exchange Authority to Issue Preferred Stock 
State corporate authority was not the only authority needed to 
issue and sell preferred stock to the U.S. government as part of the 
federal financial bailout.  Stock exchange rules applicable to listed 
companies also may govern the authority of a corporation in issuing 
preferred stock.
35
  For example, the relevant rule of the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE)—on which AIG, BoA, and Citigroup each 
have listed securities—provides that, subject to certain exceptions not 
applicable to the U.S. government’s preferred stock investments in 
AIG, BoA, or Citigroup, 
 
 34 Honeywell International Inc., Amended and Restated Certificate of 
Incorporation (Form 8-K), at Ex. 3(i) (Apr. 26, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/773840/000093041310002190/c61318_ex
3-i.htm.  This provision includes the appropriate words from the statute, but could be 
drafted better in other respects (e.g., to economize on verbiage and to eliminate the 
use of “thereto” and “hereby”). 
 35 See NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULES § 5635(d) (2009) available at 
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode
=chp%5F1%5F1%5F4%5F2&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq%2Dequityrul
es%2F; N.Y. STOCK EXCH. LISTED CO. MANUAL § 312.03 (2002), available at 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp%5
F1%5F4%5F3&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm%2Dsections%2F [hereinafter 
NYSE MANUAL].  The Model Business Corporation Act also includes a shareholder 
approval provision for large stock issuances.  See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.21(f) 
(2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/library/onlinepublications/ 
mbca2002.pdf. 
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[s]hareholder approval is required prior to the issuance of 
common stock, or of securities convertible into or exercisable for 
common stock, in any transaction or series of related transactions 
if: 
 
(1) the common stock has, or will have upon issuance, voting 
power equal to or in excess of 20 percent of the voting power 
outstanding before the issuance of such stock or of securities 
convertible into or exercisable for common stock; or 
 
(2) the number of shares of common stock to be issued is, or will 
be upon issuance, equal to or in excess of 20 percent of the 
number of shares of common stock outstanding before the 
issuance of the common stock or of securities convertible into or 
exercisable for common stock.
36
 
The rules, however, also include a provision allowing for exceptions 
from this shareholder approval requirement.  
Exceptions may be made . . . upon application to the Exchange 
when (1) the delay in securing stockholder approval would 
seriously jeopardize the financial viability of the enterprise and 
(2) reliance by the company on this exception is expressly 
approved by the Audit Committee of the Board. 
 
A company relying on this exception must mail to all 
shareholders not later than 10 days before issuance of the 
securities a letter alerting them to its omission to seek the 
shareholder approval that would otherwise be required under the 
policy of the Exchange and indicating that the Audit Committee 
of the Board has expressly approved the exception.
37
 
The U.S. government initially acquired convertible preferred 
stock in AIG representing, on an as-converted basis, 77.9% of the 
aggregate voting power of AIG’s shares of common stock.
38
  AIG 
relied on the exception to issue these shares of preferred stock.
39
  
 
 36 NYSE MANUAL, supra note 35, at § 312.03(c).  A similar exception exists under 
the NASDAQ Listing Rules. NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULES §5635(f) (Mar. 15, 
2010), available at http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer. 
asp?selectednode=chp%5F1%5F1%5F4%5F2&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnas
daq%2Dequityrules%2F.  
 37 NYSE MANUAL, supra note 35, at § 312.05. 
 38 American International Group, Current Report (Form 8-K), at Item 3.3 (Mar. 
5, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/00009501 
2309004097/y75051e8vk.htm. 
 39 Steven M. Davidoff, The A.I.G. Bailout Takes Shape, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Sept. 
24, 2008, 9:32 AM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/24/the-aig-
bailout-takes-shape. 
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However, AIG did not have enough underlying common stock to 
satisfy the conversion feature of the preferred stock.
40
  As a result, AIG 
needed to seek stockholder approval for an amendment to its 
certificate of incorporation authorizing additional shares of common 
stock for issuance upon conversion of the preferred stock.
41
  The 
certificate of designation for this series of preferred stock conditions 
the U.S. government’s conversion rights on the filing of the 
amendment to AIG’s certificate of incorporation.
42
 
Exceptions from the stockholder approval requirement for large 
stock issuances generally are rare.
43
  This is because it is hard to 
determine and prove that a “delay in securing stockholder approval 
would seriously jeopardize the financial viability of the enterprise.”
44
  
The meanings of “seriously jeopardize” and “financial viability” in this 
context are not well established.  Moreover, the NYSE does not 
publicize guidelines used by its representatives in responding to 
exemption requests. 
 
 40 See Lawrence Cunningham, AIG’s Unsupervised Capital Structure Conflicts, 
Concurring Opinions (Mar. 23, 2009, 11:52 PM), 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/03/aigs_unsupervis_1.html 
(“AIG’s charter authorizes it to issue only 5 billion common shares and 3 billion of 
those already are outstanding. That does not leave enough common shares to enable 
the preferred to be converted so that it would command more than 40% of the total 
voting power.”); Steven M. Davidoff, Sizing up A.I.G.’s New Bailout, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Nov. 10, 2008, 10:48 AM), 
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/sizing-up-aigs-new-bailout/ 
(describing the need for shareholder approval of additional authorized shares to 
cover commitments under the preferred stock).  Cf. American International Group, 
Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at Item 1.01 (Sept. 26, 2008), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/000095012308011496/y71452e8vk.
htm (indicating that the preferred shares would not be convertible until shareholder 
approval for the underlying common shares is received). 
 41 American International Group, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (June 5, 
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/00009304 
1309003116/c57286_def14a.htm; see DAVIDOFF, supra note 1, at 258. 
 42 American International Group, Inc., Amended and Restated Certificate of 
Incorporation (Form S-3), at Ex. 3(i)(a) (June 30, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/000095012309023187/y75649exv3w
iwa.htm. 
 43 See Melissa Klein Aguilar, Mutual Recognition; NYSE Shareholder Approval; More, 
COMPLIANCE WEEK, (Apr. 8, 2008), http://www.complianceweek.com/ 
article/4066/mutual-recognition-nyse-shareholder-approval-more (referring to the 
exception as “rarely used” and “infrequently utilized”). 
 44 See NYSE MANUAL, supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
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Since 2008, however, AIG and other issuers of securities have 
successfully availed themselves of the financial viability exception.
45
  
The significant number of successful applications for exceptions 
during the financial crisis, while not precedential, offers future 
issuers in corporate finance transactions a series of realistic models 
for use in decision-making and drafting.  Although the exact 
circumstances of the financial crisis are unlikely to recur in the 
future, the exceptions granted during the crisis help both issuers and 
the NYSE identify various coexisting conditions that may warrant an 
exception in similar economic times or for analogous issuers.  
Advisors have begun to recognize the value of the increased use of 
the exception, resulting in at least one firm publicizing guidelines for 
use of the exemption by issuers.
46
 
C. Terms and Provisions of Preferred Stock Issued to the U.S. 
Government 
The U.S. government purchased or otherwise acquired multiple 
series of preferred stock in AIG, BoA, and Citigroup as part of the 
federal bailout of financial services firms.
47
  These series of preferred 
stock have varied terms and provisions based on their purpose in the 
bailout of each issuer, the constraints on each issuer (including, for 
example, capital requirements for the bank issuers and other 
regulatory restrictions on the issuers), parameters set by the U.S. 
government, as the investor, and the negotiations between the 
government and each issuer.  Moreover, the U.S. government’s initial 
 
 45 Aguilar, supra note 43 (“In the first week of March, MoneyGram, Bear Stearns, 
Thornburg Mortgage, and AbitibiBowater all announced or closed investments in 
reliance on the provision.”). 
 46 See Sanjay Shirodkar & Michael Reed, How to Do a Deal Without Shareholder 
Approval: The Financial Viability Exception, NEWS & INSIGHTS, DLA PIPER, July 28, 2008, 
available at http://www.dlapiper.com/financial_viability_exception. 
 47 See American International Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 21 
(Feb. 26, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/ 
000104746910001465/a2196553z10-k.htm (mentioning the beneficial interest of the 
U.S. Department of the Treasury in the Series C Perpetual, Convertible, Participating 
Preferred Stock); id. at 311 (mentioning the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s 
ownership of Series D, Series E, and Series F preferred Stock); Bank of America 
Corporation, Form 10-K at 53) (Feb. 26, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/70858/000119312510041666/d10k.htm 
(mentioning the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s ownership of Cumulative 
Perpetual Preferred Stock Series N, Series Q, and Series R); Citigroup Inc., Annual 
Report (Form 10-K), at 192 (Feb. 26, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/000120677410000406/citi_10k.ht
m (mentioning  the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s ownership of Series H and 
Series I Cumulative Preferred Stock). 
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investments occurred over time in several tranches, and as a result, 
each party (investor and issuer) has had the opportunity to refine its 
purposes as the investments have evolved.
48
  The various terms of 
each series are too numerous to set out in full here, but the nature 
and extent of the variations are easily illustrated by summarizing a 
few of the provisions from the early preferred stock issuances. 
As in corporate finance transactions generally, there are tensions 
among the terms and provisions of each security between enabling 
the issuer to survive and (hopefully) thrive and enabling the 
investor(s) to make an adequate return and exercise some 
governance control over the issuer and the investment.  In distressed 
investment situations like this, the investor typically “holds the 
cookie”—the bargaining leverage or power; the investor has what the 
issuer desperately wants.  Unlike some corporate finance transactions, 
however, the negotiations over the U.S. government’s preferred stock 
investments and their outcome were all quite public, and the 
interested investor base included not only the U.S. government, as 
the record holder, but also U.S. taxpayers.  These factors 
undoubtedly changed the nature of the negotiations and, in turn, the 
nature of the securities themselves. 
The summary of sample terms in the U.S. government’s 
preferred stock instruments set forth below underscores a very 
important part of preferred stock as an instrument of corporate 
finance—its flexibility as a statutorily ordained and contractually 
implemented form of equity investment.  When properly authorized 
and implemented, leaving aside tax considerations (which often play 
a strong role in the debt-versus-equity debate), preferred stock—
especially convertible preferred stock—may be an optimal instrument 
of corporate finance in certain corporate finance contexts.  Both 
equity-oriented and debt-like terms can be combined in the same 
instrument—an instrument well grounded in both statutory law and 
the corporate charter.  Issuer and investor interests can be delicately 
balanced, and seemingly infinite possibilities for combinations and 
contents of provisions exist.  Note, as you read through the summary 
below, the convergence and divergence of basic terms in even these 
few sample securities. 
 
 48 See generally Lissa L. Broome, Government Investment in Banks: Creeping 
Nationalization or Prudent, Temporary Aid?, 4 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 409, 410–21 (2009) 
(describing the actual and potential phases of the government bailout of U.S. 
banking institutions). 
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1. Voting Rights 
Voting rights are present in all of the series of preferred stock 
AIG, BoA, and Citigroup issued to the U.S. government.
49
  Generally, 
each share of AIG Series C Perpetual, Convertible, Participating 
Preferred Stock has the same number of votes it would have if it were 
converted into common stock and votes together with the common 
stock.
50
  The shares of AIG Series D Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual 
Preferred Stock, however, have special class voting rights, including 
watchdog director election rights
51
 in the event of a dividend 
arrearage of four quarters and entitlement to a 66  % supermajority 
vote on: the authorization of senior and pari passu equity; 
amendments to the terms of the Series D Fixed Rate Cumulative 
Perpetual Preferred Stock or the certificate of incorporation that 
adversely affect the shares of the series; and share exchanges, 
reclassifications, mergers, and consolidations (subject to certain 
exceptions).
52
  Each holder is “entitled to one vote for each $10,000 
of liquidation preference to which such holder’s shares are 
entitled.”
53
  The shares of BoA Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual 
Preferred Stock, Series N, have watchdog director election rights in 
the event of a dividend arrearage of six quarters and entitlement to a 
66   % supermajority vote on: the authorization of senior (but not 
pari passu) equity; amendments to the terms of the Fixed Rate 
Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series N, or the certificate of 
incorporation that adversely affect the shares of the series; and share 
exchanges, reclassifications, mergers, and consolidations (subject to 
 
 49 For a general discussion of voting rights in the U.S. government’s TARP 
investments, see Benjamin A. Templin, The Government Shareholder: Regulating Public 
Ownership of Private Enterprise, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1636491_code348985.pdf?abstr
actid=1636491&mirid=1. 
 50 See American International Group, Inc., Certificate of Designations of Series C 
Perpetual, Convertible, Participating Preferred Stock (Form 10-Q), at Ex. 3(i)(a) 
(May 7, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/ 
000095012309008272/y76976exv3wiwa.htm [hereinafter AIG Series C CoD]. 
 51 “Watchdog” directors in this context are directors elected by shareholders of a 
class or series ostensibly to provide a monitoring function during a period of 
significant dividend arrearages, as defined in the terms of the preferred stock.  See 
RICHARD T. MCDERMOTT, LEGAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE FINANCE 345 (4th ed. 2006). 
 52 See American International Group, Inc., Certificate of Designations of Series D 
Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock (Form 8-K), at Ex. 3.1 (Nov. 24, 
2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/000095012 
308016447/y72888exv3w1.htm [hereinafter AIG Series D CoD]. 
 53 Id. 
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certain exceptions).
54
  Each share affords the holder one vote.
55
  
Shares of the Citigroup Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred 
Stock, Series I, have watchdog director election rights in the event of 
a dividend arrearage of six quarters and entitlement to a 66   % 
supermajority vote on: the authorization of senior (but not pari passu) 
equity; amendments to the terms of the Fixed Rate Cumulative 
Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series I, or the certificate of incorporation 
that adversely affect the shares of the series; and share exchanges, 
reclassifications, mergers, and consolidations (subject to certain 
exceptions).
56
  These voting rights are like those for the BoA Fixed 
Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series N.
57
 Yet each 
holder is “entitled to one vote for each $10,000 of liquidation 
preference to which such holder’s shares are entitled,”
58
 like the 
holders of shares of the AIG Series D Fixed Rate Cumulative 
Perpetual Preferred Stock.
59
 
2. Conversion Rights 
Although the AIG Series C Perpetual, Convertible, Participating 
Preferred Stock includes a conversion privilege exercisable at the 
option of the U.S. government,
60
 shares of the AIG Series D Fixed 
Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock,
61
 BoA Fixed Rate 
Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series N,
62
 and Citigroup 
Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series I,
63
 are not 
convertible.  Optional conversion features in preferred stock that 
permit investors to convert their preferred equity position into 
common stock (like those included in the AIG Series C Perpetual, 
Convertible, Participating Preferred Stock) offer investors the 
 
 54 See Bank of America Corporation, Certificate of Designations for the Series N 
Preferred Stock (Form 8-K), at Ex. 3.1 (Oct. 30, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/70858/000119312508220360/dex31.htm 
[hereinafter BoA Series N CoD]. 
 55 Id. 
 56 See Citigroup Inc., Certificate of Designations of Fixed Rate Cumulative 
Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series I (Form 8-K), at Ex. 3.1 (Dec. 31, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/000095010308003069/dp12158_
ex0301.htm [hereinafter Citigroup Series I CoD]. 
 57 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 58 See Citigroup Series I CoD, supra note 56. 
 59 See supra note 52 and text accompanying note 53. 
 60 See AIG Series C CoD, supra note 50. 
 61 See AIG Series D CoD, supra note 52. 
 62 See BoA Series N CoD, supra note 54. 
 63 See Citigroup Series I CoD, supra note 56. 
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opportunity to trade their preferred position in terms of dividends 
and liquidation for the more liquid, market-based upside potential of 
the common stock on specified terms and under specified 
conditions.
64
  This general type of conversion provision is 
distinguishable from mandatory conversion provisions commonly 
used in venture capital preferred stock instruments, which operate to 
automatically divest investors from their preference rights upon the 
occurrence of a specific event (commonly an initial public offering or 
a change-in-control transaction).
65
 
3. Redemption Rights 
Shares of the AIG Series C Perpetual, Convertible, Participating 
Preferred Stock are not redeemable.
66
  Shares of the AIG Series D 
Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock are redeemable at a 
redemption price equal to the shares’ liquidation preference plus, 
subject to certain exceptions, the amount of any accrued and unpaid 
dividends under certain specified circumstances involving a lack of 
control of AIG by the U.S. government.
67
  Shares of BoA Fixed Rate 
Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series N, may not be 
redeemed prior to the first dividend payment date falling on or after 
the third anniversary of the date the shares were originally issued 
(subject to certain exceptions), but may be redeemed after that time 
under specified conditions relating to bank authority approvals at a 
redemption price equal to the shares’ liquidation preference plus 
(subject to certain exceptions) the amount of any accrued and 
unpaid dividends.
68
  And finally, shares of Citigroup Fixed Rate 
Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series I, may be redeemed 
under specified conditions relating to bank authority approvals on or 
after the date on which the shares of the Citigroup Fixed Rate 
Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series H, have been 
redeemed, at a redemption price equal to the shares’ liquidation 
 
 64 See Marcel Kahan, Anti-Dilution Provisions in Convertible Securities, 2 STAN. J.L. 
BUS. & FIN. 147, 147 (1995); John L. Orcutt, Improving the Efficiency of the Angel Finance 
Market: A Proposal to Expand the Intermediary Role of Finders in the Private Capital Raising 
Setting, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 861, 892-93 (2005). 
 65 See Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: 
A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874, 881 n.26, 882 
(2003). 
 66 See AIG Series C CoD, supra note 50. 
 67 See AIG Series D CoD, supra note 52. 
 68 See BoA Series N CoD, supra note 54. 
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preference plus (subject to certain exceptions) the amount of any 
accrued and unpaid dividends.
69
 
4. Dividend Rights 
Dividends are payable on the shares of the AIG Series C 
Perpetual, Convertible, Participating Preferred Stock together with 
dividends paid on AIG’s common stock.
70
  Dividends also are payable 
on the AIG Series D Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred 
Stock, BoA Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series 
N, and Citigroup Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, 
Series I, but at specified rates and on specified dates. 
71
  Dividends on 
these three series are cumulative.
72
  “Cumulative rights to dividends 
means that if the business misses dividend payments to the preferred 
stockholders, the preferred stockholder has the right to receive back 
(missed) dividends plus the current dividend before any dividends 
are paid to the common stockholders.”
73
 
5. Preferred Stock as a Flexible, Contractual Instrument 
Even this brief summary of several of the key terms and 
provisions of the various series of preferred stock issued to or for the 
benefit of the U.S. government shows the incredible flexibility and 
range of preferred stock as an instrument in corporate finance.  
“[T]he terms of preferred stock are defined by contracts that may 
have infinite variations on the theme.”
74
  As we can see from the 
varied terms of each exemplar series described in the preceding 
paragraphs, preferred stock is highly contractual,
75
 with few 
 
 69 See Citigroup Series I CoD, supra note 56. 
 70 See AIG Series C CoD, supra note 50. 
 71 See AIG Series D CoD, supra note 52; BoA Series N CoD, supra note 54; 
Citigroup Series I CoD, supra note 56. 
 72  AIG Series D CoD, supra note 52; BoA Series N CoD, supra note 54; Citigroup 
Series I CoD, supra note 56. 
 73  Richard A. Mann et al., Starting From Scratch: A Lawyer’s Guide To Representing A 
Start-Up Company, 56 ARK. L. REV. 773, 819 (2004).  “Non-cumulative preferred stock 
means that the preferred stockholder loses dividend payments for any year in which 
no dividends were paid.”  Id.  See also Michael A. Woronoff & Jonathan A. Rosen, 
Effective vs Nominal Valuations in Venture Capital Investing, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 199, 217 
(2005) (“If a dividend is non-cumulative it is not due unless declared.  If not 
declared for a particular period, the company owes no dividends for that period.  
Because boards are unlikely to declare a dividend when not required to, 63 non-
cumulative dividends will typically not alter effective valuations.”). 
 74 D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 
1399, n.296 (2002). 
 75 Wood v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 401 A.2d 932, 937 (Del. 1979) (“For most 
purposes, the rights of the preferred shareholders as against the common 
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constraints placed on it by the state corporate statutes that authorize 
its use.
76
 
Preferred stock comes in many guises, and no single Platonic 
form underlies its variety.  Whatever its attributes (its “rights, 
preferences, and privileges,” in the jargon), preferred stock is 
quintessentially a matter of contract.  If any deviation from the 
attributes of the residual common stock concept is desired, the 
contract must specify it.  Of course this is only an imaginary 
situation.  Preferred stock not only needs to be defined by 
contract, it is defined by contract—by definition, one is tempted 
to say.
77
 
The terms and provisions of a class or series of preferred stock 
are and must be respectfully treated as a legally binding contract: it is 
the drafter’s responsibility to use this tool creatively and flexibly in 
the service of client needs, and it is the courts’ responsibility to 
interpret the drafter’s work product when its provisions are subject to 
challenge.
78
  Focused, comprehensive study of the terms and 
provisions of the various series of preferred stock acquired by the 
 
shareholders are fixed by the contractual terms agreed upon when the class of 
preferred stock is created.”); Rothschild Int’l Corp. v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 463 A.2d 
642, 646 (Del. Ch. 1983) (“The preferential rights attaching to shares of preferred 
stock are contractual in nature and are governed by the express provisions of a 
corporation’s charter.”); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1564 (1989) (“[S]enior securities, both debt and preferred 
stock, . . . frequently contain complicated contractual provisions relating to the 
circumstances of voting, representation on the board of directors, conversion into 
common stock, call protection, redemption exposure, dilution and other such 
concerns.”). 
 76 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (2010). 
 77 Richard M. Buxbaum, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance, 73 
CALIF. L. REV. 1671, 1684 (1985). 
 78 Former Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Veasey made precisely this 
point and expanded on its meaning in a seminal corporate finance case: 
     Articulation of the rights of preferred stockholders is fundamentally 
the function of corporate drafters. Construction of the terms of 
preferred stock is the function of courts. This Court’s function is 
essentially one of contract interpretation against the background of 
Delaware precedent. These precedential parameters are simply stated: 
Any rights, preferences and limitations of preferred stock that 
distinguish that stock from common stock must be expressly and 
clearly stated, as provided by statute. Therefore, these rights, 
preferences and limitations will not be presumed or implied. The other 
doctrine states that when there is a hopeless ambiguity attributable to 
the corporate drafter that could mislead a reasonable investor such 
ambiguity must be construed in favor of the reasonable expectations of 
the investor and against the drafter. 
Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843, 852–53 (Del. 1998) (footnotes 
omitted). 
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U.S. government in the federal bailout—or any other grouping of 
similarly situated securities—reminds corporate finance counsel of 
the intricacies involved in drafting preferred stock and is sure to lead 
drafters of corporate finance instruments to new insights about the 
instruments that they draft in order to bring capital into the 
corporation. 
III. REGULATION THROUGH INTERVENTION IN BANKRUPTCY 
REORGANIZATIONS 
The U.S. government’s crisis regulation through corporate 
finance extended beyond mere capital investment, however, and into 
the realm of leverage over quasi-judicial process and transaction 
partners and terms in the bankruptcy setting.  Specifically, the 
government used its position as an investor-regulator to intervene in 
arrangements for the bankruptcy reorganizations of Chrysler LLC 
(Chrysler) and General Motors Company (GM).  The government’s 
intervention shaped both the speed and certainty of these 
reorganizations. 
Chapter 11 bankruptcies often result in both the disruption of 
existing capital structures of a business association and the 
consummation of significant corporate finance transactions.  In a 
reorganization under Chapter 11, for example, the entire capital 
structure of an entity may be altered by court order, or the 
corporation’s assets may be sold to a new owner.
79
  Existing security 
holders may have little say in all this and may have their equity 
interests cancelled under the plan of reorganization pursuant to the 
“absolute priority rule.”
80
  The debtor in possession’s power of the 
pen (subject to court approval) is staggering, allowing it to overwrite 
carefully crafted terms in corporate finance instruments and ordain 
the terms and provisions of corporate finance transactions.
81
 
Both Chrysler and GM entered and exited bankruptcy in six 
weeks or less—forty-two days for Chrysler and forty days for GM.  In 
 
 79 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363, 1123, 1129 (2006).  For a discussion of both the plan-
focused reorganization apparently contemplated by the drafters of the Bankruptcy 
Code and the § 363 asset sale process that has evolved in practice, see George W. 
Kuney, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code § 363(f) and Undermining the Chapter 11 Process, 
76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235 (2002) [hereinafter Kuney, Misinterpreting]. 
 80 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (absolute priority rule). 
 81 See 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (a)–(b) (specifying what a plan shall and may provide for, 
including “merger or consolidation of the debtor with one or more persons; . . . 
cancellation or modification of any indenture or similar instrument; . . . extension or 
a maturity date or a change in an interest rate or other term of outstanding 
securities; . . . amendment of the debtor’s charter”). 
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each case, the U.S. government used its leverage as a powerful 
regulator/investor to prompt and shape a particular outcome.
82
  
“Beyond their massive size, the automakers’ bankruptcies were 
remarkable for the active role of the federal government in 
encouraging the filings and charting the course of the proceedings—
circumstances leading to concerns that their bankruptcy cases were 
unduly influenced by political actors.”
83
  Scholars now debate whether 
this political intervention in business is extraordinary or desirable.
84
 
Undoubtedly, the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies represent 
significant corporate finance events.  Both entities quickly emerged 
from bankruptcy reorganizations with different owners and capital 
structures.  In each case, the failure to fully respect the absolute 
priority rule and the priority ladder (by, for example, shorting the 
Indiana Teachers Pension Fund, a secured creditor, in favor of the 
GM Pension Fund, a junior unsecured creditor and equity holder) 
may increase uncertainty in the priority system and make investors 
less willing to invest, as the terms of their deal may be unilaterally 
changed in a Chapter 11 reorganization plan.  It is important to 
question whether the costs of this strategy and the related tactics are 
so high that they have a deleterious effect on capital markets.  Does 
the overt or subtle favoring of some parties over others in a 
bankruptcy like the Chrysler or GM bankruptcies create such an 
unpalatable impression of unfairness that investment will be 
discouraged? 
Both the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies were conducted as asset 
sales under § 363 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (“§ 363 sales”).
85
  
According to certain commentators, although the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code is not clear on the requirements for § 363 sales in this context, 
 
 82 See John E. Kwoka, Jr., The U.S. Auto Industry Under Duress: Fit, or Finished?, 5 
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 49, 68–69 (2009) (describing the two bankruptcies); 
George W. Kuney, Vacating Chrysler, 19 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 2 Art. 1 (2010) 
(providing a critique of the Chrysler bankruptcy) [hereinafter Kuney, Vacating 
Chrysler]; Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context, 83 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 531 (2009) (assessing both bankruptcies); Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, 
Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727 (2010) (criticizing the process 
of the Chrysler bankruptcy). 
 83 Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts, 62 
STAN. L. REV. 747, 749 (2010).  See also Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, 
Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648, 696 (2010) (“The bankruptcies of both GM and 
Chrysler were able to proceed at breakneck pace because one player—the United 
States government—was able to dictate the terms of the proceedings.”). 
 84 Compare Lubben, supra note 82, with Roe & Skeel, supra note 82 (arguing these 
points). 
 85 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2006).  Professor Lubben has included a helpful summary of 
the two Chapter 11 proceedings in his article cited supra note 82, at 536–39. 
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the Chrysler and GM § 363 sales failed to rigorously enforce 
applicable procedures designed to protect investors from or in the 
event of a loss of priority in a reorganization plan.
86
  A brief 
description of the two bankruptcy processes is in order.  As described 
by Professors Mark Roe and David Skeel (in the case of the Chrysler 
bankruptcy): 
 The deal’s basic structure is straightforward to summarize. 
Prebankruptcy, Chrysler was a private firm, owned by Cerberus, a 
large private equity fund.  As of the bankruptcy, its two largest 
creditors were secured creditors owed $ 6.9 billion and an 
unsecured employee benefit plan, owed $ 10 billion.  It also owed 
trade creditors $ 5.3 billion, and it had warranty and dealer 
obligations of several billion dollars. 
 
 The government created and funded a shell company that, 
through a § 363 sale from Chrysler, bought substantially all of 
Chrysler’s assets for $ 2 billion, giving the secured creditors a 
return of 29 cents on the dollar.  FIAT was brought in to manage 
the new firm and was given a slice of the new company’s stock. 
New Chrysler (formally: New CarCo Acquisition LLC) then 
assumed the old company’s debts to the retirees, most dealers, 
and trade creditors.  The $ 10 billion of unsecured claims owed to 
the retirees’ benefits plan were replaced with a new $ 4.6 billion 
note as well as 55 percent of the new company’s stock.
87
 
The result? 
 Priority seemed violated. Unsecured retiree claims were 
promised well over 50 cents on the dollar, along with control of 
the New Chrysler, and unsecured trade creditors were promised 
full payment. The secured creditors, however, were getting 29 
cents on the dollar, and future products-liability claims relating to 
Chrysler cars already on the road would receive nothing at all 
under the plan, as the pseudo-sale made no provision for them. 
Claims could be brought against only Old Chrysler, which was 
expected to soon have no assets.
88
 
 
 86 See Kuney, Vacating Chrysler, supra note 82, at 127; Roe & Skeel, supra note 82, 
at 733–34, 770.  Professors Roe and Skeel analyze the entire structure of the 
transaction in detail in the body of their article.  Id. at 734–51. 
 87 Roe & Skeel, supra note 82, at 733 (footnotes omitted); see also Templin, supra 
note 49, at 42–45. 
 88 Id.; see also Templin, supra note 49, at 43 (“[T]he Obama administration’s 
strategy was largely criticized because it interfered with the contractual rights of the 
bondholders by favoring unions in the post-bankruptcy ownership.  The pre-planned 
bankruptcy plan advocated by the Obama Administration created a post-bankruptcy 
ownership structure that favored the union-driven employment retirement funds 
rather than bondholders.”) (footnote omitted). 
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The GM bankruptcy, while more mainstream in some respects 
than the Chrysler Chapter 11 proceedings, was built off the same 
model. 
The government used the same template for the § 363 sale in GM 
as it did in Chrysler.  As in Chrysler, the buyer was not a true third 
party, the ostensible immediacy to the urgency of the sale was 
debatable, and the § 363 bidding procedures required that would-
be bidders agree to the retiree settlement negotiated by the 
government and GM. But GM’s secured creditors, unlike their 
counterparts in Chrysler, were paid in full. The GM sale was in this 
dimension thus easier to reconcile with ordinary priority rules 
than Chrysler.
89
 
The difference in the two cases is important. In the Chrysler 
proceedings, the retirees and trade creditors got more, out of 
priority, because the purchaser needed them to complete the 
transaction.  Conversely, the purchaser made a calculated judgment 
that it could treat secured creditors and tort claimants in an inferior 
manner and still complete the reorganization.  It may well be that 
Chrysler would have failed absent this disparate treatment.  The same 
type of disparate treatment did not occur in the GM Chapter 11 
reorganization. 
Yet these differences do not combat fears that the aberrant and 
flawed abbreviated § 363 sale process used in the Chrysler bankruptcy 
or the short-form process used in the GM bankruptcy will be used in 
future Chapter 11 proceedings with similarly unfair or less fair 
results.
90
  Professors Roe and Skeel note that the § 363 sale process 
used in the Chrysler bankruptcy “sharply cut off” two creditor groups 
and contend that the process affected capital markets by rewriting, 
through the bankruptcy court’s actions, the essence of the Chapter 
11 reorganization provisions in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
91
  The 
 
 89 Roe & Skeel, supra note 82, at 765. 
 90 See Id. at 731; see also Kuney, Vacating Chrysler, supra note 82, at 131 (“[T]he 
Second Circuit’s Chrysler opinion had already been used to support confirmation of 
a similar, but less draconian, section 363 transaction in the General Motors 
reorganization case and was being cited in support of similar, fast-track 
reorganization-by-sale transactions elsewhere.”); id. at 130–31 (discussing the effect 
of the Supreme Court opinion vacating the Second Circuit’s opinion in the Chrysler 
case). 
 91 See Roe & Skeel, supra note 82, at 729.  In their conclusion, Professors Roe and 
Skeel again articulate this relationship between the rules of the road in a Chapter 11 
reorganization and the capital markets. 
For minority creditors, there’s a century of bankruptcy and equity-
receivership law designed to balance protection from the majority’s 
potential to encroach on the minority and squeeze them out from their 
contractual priority against the minority’s potential to hold out 
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significant increase in volume of § 363 sales over the past ten to 
fifteen years,
92
 together with pre-existing related process erosions in 
the Chapter 11 context,
93
 certainly gives reason to reflect on the 
possibility that Chrysler-type § 363 sales may proliferate.  If Professors 
Roe and Skeel and other like commentators are right (that the 
Chrysler and GM bankruptcies represent a new form of abuse likely 
to be repeated), now is the time to prevent the identified abuses of 
process through legislation or judicial action.
94
 
Professor Stephen Lubben contests the negative views of 
Professors Roe and Skeel (and others) on the Chrysler and GM § 363 
sales and argues that the two § 363 sales were conducted in the 
ordinary course of bankruptcy practice: 
[T]he basic structure used to reorganize both GM and Chrysler 
was not unprecedented. Indeed, it was entirely ordinary. In both 
cases the “good” assets were sold to new entities. The 
consideration for that sale goes to the “old” debtor, and will be 
distributed according to the absolute priority rule. None of this 
constitutes a covert reorganization plan or a corruption of the 
bankruptcy process.
95
 
Essentially, Professor Lubben argues that the Chrysler and GM § 
363 sales represent business as usual in a Chapter 11 setting, in which 
there are limited prospects for saving the debtor from liquidation.  
True enough.  A debtor in bankruptcy admittedly has limited choices 
if it desires to remain extant.  In fact, Professor Lubben’s argument, a 
more positive view, may be in line with the majority position.  
 
perniciously.  These are neither small nor simply fairness-based 
considerations: capital markets depend on effective mechanisms that 
prevent financial majorities from ousting financial minorities from 
their ratable position in an enterprise. 
Id. at 771. 
 92 See Lubben, supra note 82, at 535. 
 93 See Kuney, Misinterpreting, supra note 79, at 235.  Professor Kuney observes: 
Seemingly slight misinterpretations can dramatically alter an entire 
statutory scheme. Like small cracks along a rock face, these slight 
imperfections provide toeholds for roots, ice, wind and water that will 
eventually erode the entire surface. Courts faced with interpretation of 
Bankruptcy Code § 363(f) prove this to be all too true. Multiple 
misinterpretations of this subsection of the Code have been repeatedly 
committed. 
Id. 
 94 See Roe & Skeel, supra note 82, at 771 (“Going forward, the extent of Chrysler’s 
damage to bankruptcy practice and financial markets will depend either on 
congressional action or on how Chrysler is construed by other courts, and whether 
they will limit its application, as they should.”). 
 95 Lubben, supra note 82, at 538 (footnotes omitted). 
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However, the incremental process erosions observed by critics of § 
363 sales may be slowly and invidiously creating a new sense of the 
ordinary course—a set of circumstances that merits attention. 
In fact, a close reading of Professor Lubben’s work is not 
inconsistent with this slippery slope argument.  In a recent piece for 
The New York Times DealBook, he describes a more recent § 363 sale 
(for Claim Jumper Restaurants, LLC) proposed to be completed in a 
compacted time frame.
96
  He sees this as more evidence that Chrysler 
and GM represent mainstream Chapter 11 proceedings, concluding 
that “[u]ltimately, only Congress can decide if this is a proper use of 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.”
97
  In closing, he then reaffirms 
that “Chrysler and G.M. did little to change the bankruptcy 
landscape, save for alerting the public to the reality that is modern 
Chapter 11 practice.”
98
  The main question debated by Professors Roe 
and Skeel, on the one hand, and Professor Lubben, on the other, is 
whether the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies represent a watershed 
that has the capacity to change the Chapter 11 process (Roe and 
Skeel) or whether Chrysler and GM are just one among a series of 
similarly situated § 363 sale cases over a ten-year period (Lubben).  
Neither side in the debate appears to be conceding. 
In the world of corporate finance, however, it may be of no 
moment whether Professor Lubben is correct in his observations and 
analysis or whether Professors Roe and Skeel have the better 
argument.  In accordance with the semi-strong version of the efficient 
capital market hypothesis, the market reacts to publicly available 
information,
99
 and the overwhelming tenor of publicly available 
 
 96 Stephen J. Lubben, A Bankruptcy Sale That Echoes G.M. and Chrysler, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Sept. 28, 2010, 3:47 PM), 
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/28/a-bankruptcy-sale-that-echoes-g-m-
and-chrysler. 
 97 Id.  No doubt Professors Roe and Skeel would characterize the Claim Jumper 
Restaurant proceeding as evidence of their foretold change in Chapter 11 practice 
heralded by the Chrysler and GM cases. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward 
a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 176–77 
(2006). 
The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (the ECMH) posits that 
efficient securities markets rapidly and accurately incorporate all 
relevant available information into the market price of any given 
security. The theory assumes that market prices react immediately to 
each new bit of public information that becomes available, and 
therefore, the price of securities is always a reflection of their fair, 
intrinsic value. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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information regarding the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies indicates 
that certain creditors with bargained-for priority positions were 
unfairly disadvantaged in the process in a manner inconsistent with 
the letter or intent of the Chapter 11 process.
100
  Moreover, different 
U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal have different ways of preventing 
reorganization plans from being effectuated through a § 363 sale, 
creating the real possibility for unequal treatment among the 
different circuits.
101
  It may be the appearance or perception of 
unfairness or inequity that creates market effects, rather than any 
reality that may be ascertainable by legal scholars or bankruptcy 
practitioners.  Accordingly, absent congressional or judicial clarity, 
consistency and transparency about the extent to which a § 363 sale 
can adjust the priority position of creditors in Chapter 11 
proceedings may provide some relief from adverse market effects by 
giving the process an air of predictability. 
Yet this consistency and transparency may be hard to achieve 
when the federal government (as an actual or potential investor), as 
well as Article II and Article III judges, has power over a debtor’s 
reorganization plan.  The government can be a game-changer.  In 
short, “[a]lthough the U.S. government rarely steps in to rescue 
private enterprises, it wields enormous power and influence when it 
does.”
102
  Many therefore may wonder, as Professor Todd Zywicki did 
in his passionate opinion piece for The Wall Street Journal,
103
 whether 
the government’s leverage creates more long-lasting effects on the 
rule of law as it relates to corporate finance. 
By stepping over the bright line between the rule of law and the 
arbitrary behavior of men, President Obama may have created a 
thousand new failing businesses. That is, businesses that might 
have received financing before but that now will not, since 
lenders face the potential of future government confiscation. In 
other words, Mr. Obama may have helped save the jobs of 
thousands of union workers whose dues, in part, engineered his 
 
 100 Interestingly, however, some major financial players are cautiously optimistic 
that secured lenders are not in peril.  See Moody’s: Secured Lenders Shouldn’t Fear 
Chrysler Precedent, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (June 22, 2009, 6:05 PM), 
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/moodys-secured-lenders-shouldnt-
fear-chrysler-precedent. 
 101 See Lubben, supra note 82, at 533–34. 
 102 James M. Lawniczak, When the Business of Government Is Business: The U.S. Auto 
Industry and the Future of Government Bailouts, J. CORP. RENEWAL, Mar. 26, 2010, 
available at http://www.turnaround.org/Publications/Articles.aspx?objectId=12653. 
 103 Todd J. Zywicki, Chrysler and the Rule of Law, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2009, at A19. 
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election. But what about the untold number of job losses in the 
future caused by trampling the sanctity of contracts today?
104
 
Along similar lines, Professor Benjamin Templin has expressed 
policy concerns emanating from constitutional principles and 
political economic theory. 
The Obama administration’s political maneuvering violated the 
spirit of the U.S. Constitution given the implicit moral principles 
supporting contract and property rights found within the 
document.  From a political economy perspective, Government 
interference with contractual and property rights fundamentally 
opposes one of the four primary institutional norms of a 
successful entrepreneurial economy.  If entrepreneurs cannot rely 
on the support of the government to enforce contractual rights, 
then they will be less willing to take risks in starting new 
companies.
105
 
Professor Templin goes on to validate specifically the concern raised 
in this Part that the government’s heavy-handed intrusion in the 
Chrysler bankruptcy process has the propensity to impact capital 
markets. 
The government led effort that reduced bondholder rights is 
expected to make the private equity firms more cautious about 
lending money to politically powerful companies.  Future lenders 
to such firms will be wary of whether their investment will be 
protected during a potential bankruptcy.  The cost of capital for 
such companies will rise in such circumstances making them less 
competitive with foreign car companies.
106
 
And Professor Richard Epstein adds his voice to the robust chorus. 
The entire structure of large credit markets . . . depends on 
following the rules of the game to the letter.  We have already 
seen that market melt down.  Add in bad bankruptcy rules and 
the risks get larger.  Memories are long in credit markets, and in 
the worst-case scenario the pricing of every major deal could be 
impacted if deviant bankruptcies become the norm.  Let’s hope 
that Chrysler and GM prove to be one-off concoctions borne of 
desperation.  But don’t bet on it yet.
107
 
So far, capital markets have survived the Chrysler and GM 
bankruptcies.  The actual long-term effects of the U.S. government’s 
 
 104 Id. 
 105 Templin, supra note 49, at 44 (footnotes omitted). 
 106 Id. at 45 (footnotes omitted). 
 107 Richard A. Epstein, Political Bankruptcies: How Chrysler and GM Have Changed the 
Rules of the Game, FREEMAN, Dec. 2009, http://www.thefreemanonline.org/ 
featured/political-bankruptcies-how-chrysler-and-gm-have-changed-the-rules-of-the-
game. 
HEMINWAY_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2010  4:02 PM 
2010] FEDERAL INTERVENTIONS 1513 
directorial role in these Chapter 11 proceedings on corporate 
finance remain to be seen.  However, economic theory and analysis 
portend possible shock waves in the capital markets, in particular if 
participants in corporate finance transactions suffer or perceive 
unchecked violations of the legal or normative rules of engagement.  
Every investor knows that issuers get to re-write financial instruments 
in Chapter 11; but they also have a sense of how far that process can 
go.  At some level of unpredictability, the players will inevitably lose 
confidence and leave the game. 
IV. REGULATION THROUGH INFLUENCE OVER MERGER AND 
ACQUISITION ACTIVITY 
The U.S. government’s influence over two key crisis-driven 
mergers—as a shadow investor of sorts
108
—is further evidence of its 
regulation through corporate finance.  As the guarantor of a last-
minute, short-term loan by JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPMorgan) to 
Bear Stearns Co. (Bear Stearns), the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York essentially brokered and compelled the sale of Bear Stearns to 
JPMorgan in March 2008.
109
  Similarly, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) used its regulatory control over Wachovia 
Corporation (Wachovia), supported in the end by favorable decisions 
of the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Trade Commission, to 
(eventually) ordain the acquisition of Wachovia by Wells Fargo & 
Company (Wells Fargo), even though the FDIC initially supported 
Citigroup’s bid for Wachovia.
110
 
Absent this unorthodox federal intervention, each of these 
transactions, effectuated by ordinary, state-law mergers, typically 
would be privately negotiated and documented to comply with laws of 
the states of incorporation of the parties, the law governing the 
 
 108 Professors Davidoff and Zaring describe the government’s role in the 
JPMorgan/Bear Stearns merger as “a deal-making middleman, a traditional role for 
investment bankers.”  Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 2, at 538. 
 109 See DAVIDOFF, supra note 1, at 138–39; Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to 
Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use of 
Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713, 717–18 (2009); Edward Pekarek & Michela Huth, Bank 
Merger Reform Takes an Extended Philadelphia National Bank Holiday, 13 FORDHAM J. 
CORP. & FIN. L. 595, 695 (2008); Templin, supra note 49, at 89; Robin Sidel et al., J.P. 
Morgan Buys Bear in Fire Sale, As Fed Widens Credit to Avert Crisis, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 
2008, at A1. 
 110 See DAVIDOFF, supra note 1, at 260–63; Frank A. Hirsch, Jr. & Joseph S. Dowdy, 
Whither Wachovia? Wells Fargo Wins The Battle For The Storied North Carolina Banking 
Institution, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 167, 169, 177-80 (2009); Press Release, Associated 
Press, Fed Approves Wells Fargo’s Wachovia Acquisition (Oct. 12, 2008), available at 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,436661,00.html. 
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various aspects of the transaction, applicable stock exchange rules, 
and other pertinent bodies of regulation (including, in these two 
cases, federal securities regulation, antitrust regulation, and banking 
regulation).  There are indicia of customary corporate finance 
transactions in both mergers.  For example, the JPMorgan/Bear 
Stearns transaction included a stock lock-up (albeit on somewhat 
non-standard terms).
111
  The Wells Fargo/Wachovia transaction 
included a purchase by Wells Fargo of a new series of Wachovia 
voting-preferred stock in exchange for shares of Wells Fargo common 
stock.
112
  Each merger agreement included a “force-the-vote” 
provision (which required, in each case, repeated submissions of the 
merger to shareholders for a vote over a fixed period of time).
113
 
Yet, the Bear Stearns and Wachovia mergers jumbled the typical 
separation of market-driven agreements on normative terms and the 
regulatory overlay for the transaction.  For example, the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury (Treasury Department) refused to 
finance an acquisition of Bear Stearns by J.C. Flowers & Co. LLC, 
preferring instead to push JPMorgan to offer Bear Stearns a low price 
(as a way of impeding future moral hazard in the financial services 
sector) and accept related financial assistance.
114
  In the case of 
Wachovia, the Chairman of the FDIC selected the initial favored 
acquiror (Citigroup) and allowed for the intervention of the 
eventual-blessed acquiror (Wells Fargo).
115
  Neither transaction 
occurred in a typical arm’s length environment, and neither 
transaction complied with the elements of good corporate finance 
procedures for approvals undertaken for financial institution mergers 
 
 111 See DAVIDOFF, supra note 1, at 142–43; Kahan & Rock, supra note 109, at 718. 
 112 See DAVIDOFF, supra note 1, at 261.  This preferred stock issuance relied on 
blank check authority in Wachovia’s articles of incorporation (as a North Carolina 
corporation) and (according to the related agreement) a waiver of the NYSE 
shareholder approval rule.  See id. at 261.  See generally supra Parts II.A & B (discussing 
blank check authority and the NYSE shareholder approval rule, respectively).  On 
the latter point, however, I note that the new series of preferred stock (Series M) is 
not convertible into common stock and (therefore) may not have triggered 
shareholder approval requirements under the NYSE rule.  See Wachovia Corp., 
Articles of Amendment (Form 8-K) at Ex. 3.1 (Oct. 10, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/36995/000119312508213052/dex31.htm 
(Articles of Amendment establishing the Series M, Class A preferred Stock); supra 
note 35 and accompanying text.  
 113 See DAVIDOFF, supra note 1, at 141, 261. 
 114 See id. at 139; Pekarek & Huth, supra  note 109, at 605; Robert J. Rhee, Fiduciary 
Exemption for Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public Good, and the Hobson's Choice 
During a National Crisis, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 661, 682 (2010). 
 115 See id. at 261–62. 
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and acquisitions outside a financial-crisis environment.
116
  Shareholder 
allegations of unlawful terms and breaches of fiduciary duty ensued.
117
 
This intermixing of public regulation and private deal-making 
disrupts the market for corporate control.
118
  In theory, members of 
the acquiror’s and target’s management, not government regulators, 
are the best-equipped people to negotiate a full and fair price and 
appropriate terms for the benefit of the target’s shareholders when 
the target is to be sold.
119
 
The key question . . . is whether the government or some 
governmentally appointed agent of the public interest can 
distinguish, in advance, between individual transactions that will 
be good and those that will be bad for the economy.  Can the 
government determine whether a merger will work out in the 
efficient and profitable way that the parties are betting it will?  We 
think it is clear that the government is incapable of making that 
judgment.
120
 
By forcing transactions, picking transaction partners, and defining or 
constraining transactional terms, the U.S. government may be 
mandating or fostering business combination transactions, capital 
structures, and management teams that do not enhance shareholder 
value or provide additional benefits to other corporate 
constituencies.  Consider, for example, the Treasury Department’s 
 
 116 See Memorandum from Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, Courts 
Uphold Sales of Wachovia and Bear Stearns: What the Financial Crisis Has Brought 
Together, Let No Judge Put Asunder (Jan. 9, 2009), available at 
http://www.ffhsj.com/siteFiles/Publications/195087EE5830C30A790D5B34530FF2E
C.pdf. 
 117 See Hirsch & Dowdy, supra note 110, at 181–91; Kahan & Rock, supra note 109, 
at 720–21.  
 118 Jonathan R. Macey, The Politization of American Corporate Governance, 1 VA. L. & 
BUS. REV. 10, 25–26 (2006) (“The market for corporate control is a pure market 
process. Government intervention is not needed to correct structural defects in this 
market. Rather, regulatory intervention, when it occurs, reflects the efforts of special 
interest groups . . . .”); Richard S. Ruback, Law and Economics: An Economic View of the 
Market for Corporate Control, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 613, 613–14 (1984) (“The market for 
corporate control is the arena in which management teams compete for the right to 
manage resources. In this managerial competition model of the market for corporate 
control, management teams are the activists . . . .”) (footnote omitted). 
 119 Id. at 616 (“Ignoring conflict of interest problems, the evaluation by the 
incumbent management team is most efficient since they are likely to have the best 
information set. Since the incumbent management team typically wants to retain its 
position, it is unlikely that it would approve a merger at less than the full value of the 
target firm.”). 
 120 Douglas H. Ginsburg & John F. Robinson, The Case Against Federal Intervention 
in the Market for Corporate Control, BROOKINGS REV., Winter/Spring 1986, at 9, 11. 
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low-price mandate in the JPMorgan/Bear Stearns merger.
121
  The 
government’s involvement suppressed market-based competition 
between management teams.  As a result of shareholder and 
employee dissatisfaction with the low deal price, JPMorgan increased 
the merger consideration from two dollars per share to ten dollars 
per share.
122
  Of course, these facts evidence both the lack of market 
involvement in the initial price setting and the market’s eventual, 
albeit limited, power (through shareholder intervention) to force 
price modification. 
The government’s influence in the Bear Stearns and Wachovia 
transactions represents a rare, but non-exclusive, way in which 
government impacts the market for corporate control.
123
  Through 
antitrust, securities, and corporate law, federal and state governments 
routinely rebalance the market for corporate control.  Yet as is true in 
the Chapter 11 context addressed in Part III of this Article, the 
federal government’s influence as a non-regulatory player in mergers 
and acquisitions transactions is less transparent and predictable, 
raising concerns about potential effects on broad markets and the 
potential for opportunistic abuses of power. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the government’s actions are . . . lessons for deal-making and 
deals.  It is an incredible illustration of the potential for deal-
making.  In pushing the limits of the law, the government has 
created precedent for extreme deal-making situations.  This is 
precedent not only for future government action to stem systemic 
panic, but also for private dealmakers structuring deals.
124
 
 
The U.S. government’s investment in private enterprise in 
response to the financial crisis provides valuable opportunities to 
make important observations useful to corporate finance practice.  
For example, the U.S. government’s preferred stock purchases 
highlight the utility of blank check preferred stock as an essential 
predicate to last-minute equity financings while at the same time 
casting light on drafting weaknesses in charter provisions conferring 
 
 121 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 122 See DAVIDOFF, supra note 1, at 146; Pekarek & Huth, supra note 109, at 697. 
 123 See George Bittlingmayer, The Market For Corporate Control (Including Takeovers), 
in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS 725, 732 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De 
Geest eds. 1996–2000), available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/5640book.pdf (“The 
federal government may interfere with the transfer of control on various grounds.”). 
 124 See DAVIDOFF, supra note 1, at 247. 
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blank check authority.  Moreover, exceptions to the NYSE 
shareholder approval rules granted to AIG (and others) afford us 
with more information about the confluence of circumstances that 
may excuse the need for stockholder approval of large stock 
issuances.  In addition, the varied terms of the U.S. government’s 
preferred stock investments constitute a prominent reminder of the 
relatively flexible, contractual nature of preferred stock as a financing 
and regulatory tool.  It is incumbent upon and beneficial to drafters 
of corporate finance instruments to harness this flexible tool in 
service of the client. 
Similarly, the U.S. government’s interference in private 
enterprise during the financial crisis offers us opportunities to reflect 
on interconnections between bankruptcy process and corporate 
finance—or more specifically, capital markets.  The costs associated 
with the short-form § 363 sales used in the Chrysler and GM 
bankruptcies may discourage capital investment.  The reality of these 
costs may be less important than the public perception of them in 
creating adverse market effects.  Accordingly, absent changes in the 
law that curtail or prevent the re-writing of the process involved in § 
363 sales, enhanced consistency in and transparency about the 
appropriate use of the § 363 sale process by and at the behest of the 
U.S. government and others will be necessary to minimize market 
disruptions.  Corporate finance counsel are well advised to 
understand the bankruptcy process in representing both issuers and 
investors, so that bankruptcy risk may be more accurately assessed 
and priced. 
Finally, the U.S. government’s influence over private enterprise 
during the financial crisis disrupts the market for corporate control 
that drives a segment of the mergers and acquisitions market.  By 
interceding in what otherwise would be privately negotiated mergers 
and acquisitions, the U.S. government challenges mergers and 
acquisitions law and norms and changes the nature of mergers and 
acquisitions practice.  Governmental interventions in mergers and 
acquisitions may result in mispriced, mistimed, or otherwise 
suboptimal transactions and may perpetuate or proliferate the kind 
of poor corporate management and substandard stock performance 
that contributed to the severity of the financial crisis. 
The bottom line?  The U.S. government both used and 
subverted corporate finance instruments and transactions in rescuing 
numerous systemically important firms during the recent financial 
crisis.  As a result, corporate finance drafting and practice has been 
thrust into the spotlight.  The high visibility of corporate finance 
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drafting and practice enables us to more clearly identify and correct 
flawed or inferior provisions in corporate finance instruments and 
contracts, to better evaluate the need for shareholder approvals in 
difficult economic times and for specific issuers, and to focus on the 
creative use of the malleable, contractual nature of preferred stock in 
non-normative and normative corporate finance situations.  In 
addition, federal incursions into bankruptcy and mergers and 
acquisitions practice are forcing corporate finance scholars and 
practitioners to rethink both the theory and practical realities of 
corporate finance in these contexts. 
The overall presence of the federal government as a player in 
the game of corporate finance also has broader ramifications.  
Investor confidence in our capital markets depends, in part, on the 
certainty and predictability of corporate finance instruments and 
transactions.  As examples included in this Article and elsewhere 
illustrate, U.S. government investment and interference in and 
influence over private enterprise decreases this certainty and 
predictability.  A lack of consistency and transparency enhances this 
effect.
125
  “Government by deal at times appeared to reduce 
confidence in the markets.”
126
  More significant or long-term 
government participation in corporate finance transactions—in 
 
 125 See Barbara Black, The U.S. as a Reluctant Shareholder: Government, Business, and 
the Law, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 28–29), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1646943 
(“[M]embers of the public understandably want greater transparency, in order to 
assess for themselves how these uneasy alliances between government and business 
are working out.”).  Transparency may be especially important where the 
government is a shareholder. 
In a corporation in which the government has taken a substantial 
equity interest, however, members of the general public have reason 
for concern, for this is an extraordinary situation in which all U.S. 
taxpayers have a sizable stake.  It is also understandable that, given the 
unusual situation, the public would be confused or mistrustful of 
government intervention. Under these circumstances, the government 
should work with management for maximum transparency consistent 
with protecting the corporation’s legitimate needs for confidentiality. 
Id. at 29. 
 126 DAVIDOFF, supra note 1, at 269.  Professor Templin also makes this point: 
If the state, rather than market forces, determines winners and losers, 
some firms gain a competitive edge not based on efficiency and 
prudent management but on political influence and bargaining.  Such 
political interference can have consequences for the political economy 
as a whole since private investors may become reluctant to participate 
in some ventures if they know the state is going to interfere. 
Templin, supra note 49, at 38–39 (footnote omitted). 
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whatever form or forms it may take—may have a destabilizing effect 
on capital markets and therefore should not be undertaken lightly. 
 
